Cultivating New Voters: A “Risky Bet” or a Winning Strategy?

Two Parties, Two Choices, Two Results

I first learned that turnout was not a given but a possible strategy, watching a Democrat primary race for governor between an outsider and the Party endorsed lieutenant governor.

The outsider’s campaign assumed they would get none of the usual primary vote. To have a chance of winning they had to double the normal turnout. Everything they did, their organizing, their events, their advertising, their message was focused on motivating people, who never voted in primaries, to do it this time. They succeeded in doubling the turnout and won by a few thousand votes.

I was reminded of that campaign last October when reading a New York Times story of the “risky bet” a Trump aligned group was placing on “infrequent voters”. Focusing heavily on Arizona, Turning Point’s strategy targeted “low propensity voters” that the reporter dissed as “the sort of alienated, disconnected people, especially men, who’d presumably gravitate toward Trump if they could be bothered to cast ballots at all.”

It was an “untested approach” that carried “obvious risks” and “rarely succeeds.” The example cited was Bernie Sanders’s primary campaign in 2020, “which counted on mobilizing the politically disengaged with a fiery populist message, only to lose decisively in Michigan.” What the reporter missed is the difference between fiery talk and organizing.

Six weeks after the election, a second Times headline grudgingly admitted, “A Pro-Trump Group’s Risky Bet on Infrequent Voters Seems to Have Paid Off.”

That bet, not new, was laid down after Obama’s second election and pundits were predicting Democratic victories for years to come, ensured by growing minority populations and the coming of age of a young progressive generation.

For more than a decade now, conservative organizations, often working through churches and religious organizations, have focused on motivating new people, particularly in the rural areas of swing states, to get registered and vote.

Largely overlooked, that effort by Americans for Prosperity, the National Rifle Association, the National Center for Life and Liberty and others has paid off.

No one expected Republican Glenn Youngkin to win election as governor in Virginia in 2021. But far more voters than anyone anticipated went to the polls in the rural parts of Virginia pushing total turnout 25 percent higher than any previous governor’s race in the state’s history.

The Democrat campaign exceeded all of its projected “win” numbers but lost in a rural red tide of new voters they didn’t see coming.

The 2012, 2020, and 2024 presidential elections in Wisconsin all set new records for turnout. Some 355,000 more people went to the polls this past election than twelve years ago. The Republican vote, which accounted for 290,000 of the increase, was also an all-time high. Of the additional Republican votes, 70 percent were from the 54 most rural counties.

Obama lost those counties to Romney by only 5,000. Harris lost those same counties by 245,000. The Democrat vote was down, however, by only 36,000. The rest of her losing margin in rural Wisconsin came from new voters – the “alienated” and “disconnected” who decided to “bother”.

The 2016 assumption by Chuck Shumer, Democrat leader in the US Senate, “For every blue-collar Democrat we lose in (rural areas), we will pick up two moderate Republicans in the suburbs,” was accurate only to a point.

Compared to Obama, Harris lost 36,000 Democrat votes in the rural counties and picked up 85,000 Democrat votes in the 18 more urban counties – a little better than two to one. Unaccounted for by Schumer was the 204,000 new rural Republican voters.

The increase in turnout and the increase in the Republican vote, although largely rural, was statewide. Turnout in November was the highest ever in 68 of the 72 counties. The Republican vote was also the highest ever in 68 counties. (The four outliers were not identical.)

In contrast, the Democrat vote was the highest ever in only 9 counties. In 58 counties, mostly in the West and North, the Democrat vote reached its high-water mark in 2004 or 2008. A generation ago in political time. The decline of the Party in the state’s rural areas started long before it was noticed. There has been no notable effort by the Party to energize new voters and reverse the trend.

In contrast, Turning Point’s efforts in Arizona to turn rural residents into Republican voters was intentional, well planned and focused.

“Hundreds of paid staff members worked to build enduring relationships with Arizonans whom Turning Point saw as friendly to Republicans, targeting a smaller universe of voters than traditional canvassing operations … Its staff members kept up frequent contact with targeted voters in an effort to build deeper personal relationships.”

Tyler Bowyer, Turning Point’s chief operating officer, described the strategy this way. “We weren’t focused on door knocks and door-hangers hung and things like that. Those are kind of filler stats. We were more focused on relationships built. When you’re focused on relationships built, you actually know who that person is, something about them, what makes them tick, what moves them.”

I remembered the years I was a Democrat precinct committeeperson back in Illinois, elected by the primary voters in my precinct. Along with the other 216 committeepersons in the county, our job was to deliver votes on election day. We lived in the neighborhood. Our kids all went to the same schools. We brought a six-pack to the summer block party. Welcomed people when they moved in. Got them registered to vote. Helped if they had problems with local government. By the time I knocked on a door for the third time come election season, I was a familiar face and people wanted to talk.

The Libre Initiative, a Koch backed organization created after the 2012 election to cut into the then large share of Hispanic votes going to Democrats, sponsored English classes, driver's license workshops and other social programs to first build a relationship. The goal, "If they trust us, they may seek our opinion on something else.”

Abraham Lincoln summed up the key to successful political organizing, “If you would win a man to your cause, first convince him you are his sincere friend.”

The difference in organizing strategy between the two parties was described in a New York Times story three weeks before the election. “The Ground Game: Harris’s Turnout Machine vs. Trump’s Unproven Alliance.”

The lead sets the stage. “Inexperienced conservative groups are going up against a more tightly organized Democratic operation.” The two are following “radically different theories of how to win: one tried-and-true, the other untested in modern presidential campaigns.”

The Democrat strategy was “an expansive version of the type of field operation that has dominated politics for decades.” Recruit your strongest followers to be volunteers. Turn out your base of supportive voters. Win over independent and moderate Republican voters. In the previous week, the campaign told the reporter, over 600,000 doors had been knocked, over three million calls made, and 63,000 volunteers had done shifts.

The target universe was registered voters. The winning margin would come from persuading independent and moderate Republican voters. Abortion, the threat to democracy, and Trump’s character were the issues to make the case with them. Harris campaigned in suburban areas with Liz Chaney and other anti-Trump Republicans.

The strategy of the Republicans was almost the opposite. They assumed those who voted for Trump previously would back him again in large numbers. There was no need to waste time and resources contacting them. Convincing swing voters and moderate Democrats was not necessary. There were far more conservative leaning infrequent and unregistered voters to appeal to.

After the election, Turning Point told the Times they had built a list of roughly 400,000 low-propensity voters to target across Arizona. Most were from rural areas. Mesa, however, was “crucial”. There were “tens of thousands of people who just didn’t vote, and that’s all within like, basically, a two-mile radius.”

The strategy worked. The “bet” paid off. Voting data compiled by TargetSmart, a Democrat polling firm, shows infrequent voters and voters who voted for the first time in Arizona gave Republicans a 417,000 to 322,000 advantage.

What does all of this mean for Democrats here in Wisconsin – and nationally -- going forward?

You fish where the uncaught fish are.

Even in 2020 when the presidential vote across the country was the highest ever, one third of the eligible population – 80 million people – did not register to vote and did not go to the polls.

In off year elections, even fewer people vote. And those who vote in primaries where candidates are chosen – the most important political decision – are fewer still.

A winning strategy that focuses how and where you organize starts with knowing how many votes you need to win, where they can be found, and how you can connect with them.

In Kathleen’s first race for the Senate, an off-year election, she spent time and organized in wards where turnout in an off-year election typically was half that in presidential years and seven out of ten who stayed home were Democrats.

The campaign’s organizing strategy was to maximize quality contacts with voters. Neighborhood house parties often attended by 30 to 45 were scheduled. People had the chance to meet, hear and ask questions of Kathleen for more than an hour. Our goal was to turn them into knowledgeable advocates and multiply the number of voices in a neighborhood.

In the ward where the campaign scheduled the most house parties the Democrat vote went up by 300. In the district, turnout increased by 7,000, the Democrat vote went up 5,000 and Kathleen won over the Republican incumbent by 2,000.

The strategy party leaders in Madison wanted the campaign to follow focused on maximizing the number of contacts. How many doors knocked. Keep moving. Stick to the doors on your walk list. Limit the conversation to 30 seconds. Use only poll tested phrases. There was no role for house parties and the extended discussion and genuine interaction needed to draw new people in.

Who are the 80 million uncaught fishes in presidential races?

A disproportionate share are those with lower incomes and those with a high school rather than a college education and who disproportionately live in rural areas. They tend to be more religious and more conservative on cultural issues.

Households with incomes over $100,000 are 50 percent more likely to be registered voters than households with the lowest incomes. College graduates are 50 percent more likely to be registered than high school graduates. Homeowners are 50 percent more likely to be registered than renters.

After Youngkin rode a wave of new voters to win the governor’s race in Virginia four years ago, Guy Cecil, the chairman of the Democratic super PAC Priorities USA called the election an “inflection point” and noted the obvious danger to Democrats in future elections. “There are millions of people across the country who are inclined to vote for Trump or Republicans who don’t vote.”

Which brings us back to Wisconsin, where the organizing strategy of the Democratic Party was focused on registered voters and turning out the base. That goal was achieved in 2024. The base did turn out as the chair of the state party noted in his weekly newsletter three days after the election.

“Harris earned more than 30,000 more raw votes than Biden. She earned more votes (48,000) than Obama in 2012 and almost as many as Obama in 2008 …”

He added, in his only nod to the Republican win, “It’s just that there was an even larger group of voters, a quieter group, that turned out and voted for Trump.”

Left unsaid was that the ‘quieter’ group, following a strategy of going after new voters, had added 290,000 votes in presidential races – six times the number added by Democrats.

The Party’s other message that we lost Wisconsin by a smaller percentage than any other state allows us to think that with a little more effort, a few more dollars, some additional organizers, a different candidate, and better messaging we will be okay next time. We can stick with our underlying organizing strategy.

In off-year elections turning out the base has been successful as Democrat turnout has moved closer to presidential years, particularly in Madison and Dane County where neighborhood activist groups have done much of the organizing. Numbers also indicate that perhaps half the new Republican voters in presidential years did not return to the polls in the following off-year election.

Organizing, to be successful, requires a plan, long-term commitment, local leaders, local participants and ongoing activity. You can’t gear up for one campaign, shut down and start all over again come the next election, with different people, different leadership and probably a different strategy – which tends to happen with centrally run “coordinated campaigns”.

There is no ongoing connection between the Party and voters. Between the door knocker and the person who opens the door. Too often the reaction is, “You come around only at election time when you want our votes.”

Block Captains is one of the new programs initiated several elections ago by the Democrat Party in Nebraska. Volunteers are given 50 doors in their neighborhood to canvass three times each year as a way to develop relationships with voters beyond election cycles. The number of Democrats elected up and down the ballot across the state has grown from 500 in 2016 to over 900 in 2023.

In the many post mortems of the election, none that I read mention the Party’s organizing strategy as potentially contributing to the Democrat defeat. Depending on the writer, blame is placed on the actors, the economy, the mood of voters, or the message. There is no hint that perhaps the original planning based on how many votes it would take to win, where those votes could be found, and how to organize and connect with them, was faulty.

James Carville, who has become a go-to Democrat guru in the years since he managed Bill Clinton’s 1992 campaign, is perhaps typical. There was a single cause for the loss. The economy. The solution: finding a different way to talk about it.

“We lost for one very simple reason: It was, it is and it always will be the economy … We have to begin 2025 with that truth as our political north star and not get distracted by anything else ... We must focus on revving up a transformed messaging machine … It’s about finding ways to talk to Americans about the economy that are persuasive. Repetitive. Memorable.”

Talk, even persuasive poll tested focus group approved talk, honed by expensive messaging consultants, is still just talk. Someone known and trusted has to carry the message. Remember Lincoln. “If you would win a man to your cause, first convince him you are his sincere friend.” That’s the hard part of political organizing, but necessary when winning depends on cultivating new voters.